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Abstract: In the dispute between Strasbourg and Westminster over prisoners’ voting rights, 
the arguments of both sides help to consolidate the emerging ‘post-democratic’ political regime 
in Europe. The UK government’s position in Hirst v UK, and the judgments of the Strasbourg 
courts in Hirst, Frodl v Austria and Scoppola v Italy, all assume that democracy is no more than a 
matter of voter-consumers choosing between competing alternatives in the political market 
place. This minimalist conception of democracy also underlies the argument that enfranchising 
convicted prisoners will contribute to their rehabilitation. If, by contrast, democracy is thought 
of as a regime that seeks to achieve the collective self-government of the people, then one of 
its principles is that only those who enjoy civil liberties and formal independence of the 
executive can be self-governing citizens. Enfranchising prisoners subverts that democratic 
principle. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 prohibits convicted 
prisoners from voting in national or local elections until after their release. In Hirst 
v UK the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ruled that this 
ban violated prisoners’ right to vote, a right protected by Article 3 of Protocol 1 
ECHR. This has led to a prolonged stand-off between the UK government and 
parliament, on the one hand, and the Strasbourg court on the other - a stand-off 
that is still going on at the time of writing. In this, as in so many questions relating 
to criminal justice, a large majority of expert academic and legal opinion – in 
backing Strasbourg’s demand that the ban be reformed – finds itself at odds with 
both parliament and the government.1  
Against the grain of the academic literature, I will argue here that the 
Strasbourg court is wrong and that the UK’s ban is necessary in a democratic 
society. I will not, however, adopt the retributive argument that the UK 
government has made in defence of the ban.  On the contrary, I will develop the 
democratic argument in favour of the ban by first explaining why the UK 
government’s position is an undemocratic one, and why it failed to convince the 
Grand Chamber. Then I will argue that the Strasbourg court’s judgments reveal 
assumptions that, from the democratic point of view, are no better than the 
government’s argument. I will conclude that the widespread support for the Hirst 
judgment among penal reformers and human rights advocates constitutes a greater 
danger to democracy than the government’s arguments in favour of the ban. 
The essence of my argument is that both the UK government and the 
Strasbourg court imagine democratic citizenship to be no more than a question of 
choosing between alternative political representatives. The Court’s position, in 
particular, implicitly discounts the right of citizens in a democracy to influence 
both the choices that other citizens make and the political content of the available 
choices, and their right to enjoy this influence independently of executive 
interference. This thin conception of democracy, that both sides of the argument 
over prisoner enfranchisement take for granted, is consistent with contemporary 
political life in Europe. It is, however, a counterfeit of democracy in the sense of a 
society in which the people collectively govern themselves because they are the 
authors of the laws that they obey. Retaining the ban on prisoners’ voting is the 
only decision that will not further institutionalize this counterfeit in the UK’s 
political life. 
I will not, therefore, be holding up one straw man that regularly gets knocked 
down by opponents of the ban. The argument made here is not that prisoners 
ought to suffer ‘civic death’ or anything like it. Prisoners have rights, and any 
                                                     
1 I have been unable to find any argument in favour of the UK’s ban or against the Hirst judgment in the 
recent academic literature on the subject. In February 2011 the House of Commons voted 
overwhelmingly against reforming the ban. 
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society that takes collective self-government seriously will take a very close interest 
in protecting prisoners’ rights and improving their welfare.2 Many aspects of the 
UK’s current penal policy would shame a democracy that took collective self-
government seriously. The ban on prisoners voting is, however, not one of them. 
 
 
 
THE GOVERNMENT’S ARGUMENT IN HIRST 
 
The UK government argued that, while the ban was an interference with 
prisoners’ rights, it was not a violation of the Convention because it was necessary 
in a democratic society in pursuit of the legitimate aims of ‘preventing crime and 
punishing offenders and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of 
law’. The ban served these aims ‘by depriving those who had breached the basic 
rules of society of the right to have a say in the way such rules were made for the 
duration of their sentence’.3 The government added that ‘Convicted prisoners had 
breached the social contract and so could be regarded as (temporarily) forfeiting 
the right to take part in the government of the country.’4 Finally, it argued that the 
limitation on prisoners’ right to vote was proportional since it lasted only for as 
long as they were imprisoned.5  
The problem with this argument is that the final claim that 
disenfranchisement is proportional because limited to the period of imprisonment 
is undermined by the preceding argument that prisoners have forfeited their 
political rights because they have breached the social contract. To argue that those 
who breach the ‘basic rules of society’ lose the right to vote is to claim too much. 
Assuming that prohibitions on assaults, acts of vandalism and thefts of personal 
property are among the basic rules of a democratic society, then these basic rules 
are broken by all those who commit these offences, including many who will not 
go to prison. According to the government these offenders too have forfeited the 
right to take part in the government of the country. The government’s argument 
therefore misses its target. It needs to justify the disenfranchisement of prisoners, 
not of all offenders.  
We will return to this below, but first we should understand that the 
government’s argument, although it may appear to be democratic – only those 
who play by the rules get to make them – betrays a thin conception of democracy, 
one in which citizens get to vote but they are not addressed by the penal law as if 
they were its ultimate authors.  To see why disenfranchising all offenders makes it 
impossible to maintain a penal law that respects the authority of citizens as the 
                                                     
2 For more of this argument, see P Ramsay ‘Voters Should not be in Prison: The Rights of Prisoners in a 
Democracy’ (2013) 16(3) Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (forthcoming). 
3 Hirst v UK 2005, para [50]. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid para [51]. 
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ultimate source of legal obligations, we have first to understand why democracies 
are able to punish citizens at all. 
In a democracy, citizens are formally equal as the ultimate source of legitimate 
government action under law. Any punishment is a deprivation of their rights by 
the state, and the state would fail to treat citizens as equal in their formal authority 
if it were able to deprive citizens of their rights without their prior authorization. 
Explicit authorization of punishment by the person punished would be rare 
indeed. Nevertheless, such authorization is implicit to the extent that an offender 
actively denies another’s citizenship rights by breaching the basic rules of society, 
since to that extent the offender denies citizenship rights as such, including her 
own. It is important to recognize that the most familiar and longstanding offences 
involve just such a denial of citizenship. An offender who deliberately and 
coercively attacks another’s person or property, by making a claim of natural right 
in the Hobbesian sense, denies the other’s personhood, which is to say, the other’s 
capacity for self-government.6 Homicide, assault, sexual assault, criminal damage, 
thefts of personal property, for example, are, on this account, all violations of 
personhood. In so far as a political regime takes collective self-government 
seriously, citizenship must presuppose the personhood of citizens, because 
personhood is the characteristic that lends individuals the capacity to partake in 
collective self-rule.7  The offender’s denial of personhood represented by the 
offence is, therefore, also a denial of democratic citizenship rights in so far as it 
treats the presuppositions of citizenship as of no account next to the satisfaction 
of the offender’s own appetites and desires.8 
To the extent that the commission of an offence is, therefore, an active denial 
of citizenship, and only to that extent, the offender authorizes the state to act on her 
own denial of citizenship and deprive her of her citizenship rights in the form of 
punishment.9 This democratic authorization of punishments entails a system of 
                                                     
6 ‘Deliberately’ implies that the offence includes some fault requirement – that the prosecutor must prove 
that the defendant was at fault for the attack.  
7 A democracy will also need to uphold citizenship rights that go beyond interests in personhood, and 
uphold them in the form of ‘basic rules of society’ by means of penal regulation. But this is not a 
fundamental consideration in the present context. For more on this, see Ramsay n 2 above. 
8 Providing imprisonable offences require proof of a fault element, there is, therefore, no need to prove 
separately that the offender intended to repudiate the social contract (contra S Brenner and NJ Caste 
‘Granting the Suffrage to Felons in Prison’ (2003) 34(2) Journal of Social Philosophy 228, 239). Christopher 
Bennett also recognizes that offending characteristically involves ‘a failure to respect the basic terms of 
the civic relationship’, see C Bennett, 'Penal Disenfranchisement', Paper for the Democracy and Criminal 
Justice Project (available at http://www.democracyandcriminaljustice.org/ 
penal_disenfranchisement_paper). But Bennett overlooks the essential connection between political 
rights and civil liberties that I argue for below and so misreads disenfranchisement as an extra retributive 
punishment, see text at n 38 below.   
9 Of course, it can be argued that it is unjust to punish many individuals who fail to obey the basic rules of a 
society if the distribution of wealth and opportunity in that society systematically disadvantages those 
who often end up before the criminal courts. But this is an argument about the justice of the penal law as 
such. Any society that aspired to collective self-government would address such issues as a matter of 
urgency, but it would not do so by undermining the basis of democratic self-government in the way that, 
as I will argue below, prisoner enfranchisement does. It is an insult to both democracy and prisoners to 
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ordinally proportionate penalties: the more serious the offence, the more serious 
the denial of citizenship rights, the more serious the penalty – and vice versa.10 
Only with such ordinally proportionate punishments are citizens coerced as equals 
because only such proportionate penal deprivation of rights can be regarded as 
implicitly authorized by the offender who suffers them, and therefore within the 
democratic authority of the state to impose.  
If all offenders are disenfranchised, however, the system of ordinally 
proportionate punishments is anchored at such a high level on the cardinal scale 
that it is inconsistent with the democratic presupposition that offenders are 
persons. In a democracy that takes collective self-government seriously, the right 
to vote is the ‘right of rights’.11 Removing that right is therefore a very serious 
punishment. Disenfranchising minor offenders would mean that the lowest point 
on the scale of punishments is a very serious deprivation of rights. An ordinally 
proportionate system of punishment anchored at this point would have to impose 
very severe punishments on more serious offenders if it was to treat citizens 
equally and distribute punishments consistently with the equal authority of 
citizens. The result would be that more serious offenders would routinely have to 
endure very long terms of imprisonment.12 This would amount to society 
effectively giving up on these offenders. The incapacitating severity of the penal 
system would fail to treat many prisoners as persons, potential authors of their 
own lives, in a way that they have not authorized. Efforts at rehabilitation would 
become pointless among the many offenders who would not leave prison for 
decades. A democracy that routinely imprisoned offenders for large portions of 
their lives on the basis of the (albeit serious) errors they had made would violate its 
own premise that its citizens, because they are persons, are capable of self-rule 
(notwithstanding the many errors of all sorts that persons and democratic citizens 
will doubtless make). The penal law would cease to address citizens with threats of 
punishment that took them seriously as persons and, therefore, as the authors of 
the laws that they were required to obey. Instead the law would merely terrorize 
the citizenry.13 
In other words, the underlying political content of the government’s overly 
broad and speciously democratic argument for the disenfranchisement of 
prisoners is the familiar ‘tough on crime’ message that has been a staple of 
                                                                                                                                       
argue that prisoners should have the vote because the loss of civil liberty that results from their 
imprisonment is unjustified. It is the prisoners’ loss of civil liberty that we should be addressing (see also 
n 40 below).  
10 It entails a good deal more than this as well, including, in one form or another, adequate guaranteed 
access to the goods necessary to live the life of a citizen (see Ramsay, n 2 above).  
11 William Cobbett cited in J Waldron, ‘Participation: The Right of Rights’ (1998) Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 307. 
12 Note that disenfranchising only prisoners does not escalate ordinally proportionate sentences in this way. 
Once the threshold of imprisonment is passed the loss of the vote persists in exact proportion to the loss 
of liberty. The UK government asserted this point in Hirst but was unable to explain why prisoners 
should lose the right to vote at all when other offenders did not. See text after n 14 below.  
13 Compare A von Hirsch, ‘Proportionate Sentences: A Desert Perspective’ in A von Hirsch, A Ashworth 
and J Roberts (eds), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (Hart, 2009) 120-21. 
                           7/2013 
 
 6
contemporary political life. The government’s argument, if seen through on its 
own terms, would discount the equality of citizens by threatening them with a 
penal law that was inconsistent with their ultimate authority. Moreover, this 
argument entirely fails to explain why the disenfranchisement of imprisoned 
offenders is necessary in a democratic society. In Hirst the court ruled that ‘the 
principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between the 
sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned’.14 The 
government’s argument demonstrates a discernible link between the 
disenfranchisement of prisoners and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for 
the rule of law – prisoners have broken the basic rules of society. But it has not 
shown a sufficient link so as to explain why it is necessary that only prisoners should be 
disenfranchised, since many unimprisoned offenders have also broken the basic 
rules. Banning only imprisoned offenders from voting implies that it is offence 
seriousness that is the reason that provides the link, but offers no explanation as 
to why seriousness sufficient for imprisonment should mark the point at which 
offenders lose the vote.  
 
 
 
THE HIRST JUDGMENT AND AFTER 
 
The majority of Strasbourg judges in the Hirst court concluded from this failing in 
the UK’s argument that disenfranchising all prisoners must be an arbitrary 
interference in the right. In their opinion, the UK’s ban:  
 
strips of their Convention right to vote a significant category of persons and 
it does so in a way which is indiscriminate. It imposes a blanket restriction on 
all convicted prisoners in prison. It applies automatically to such prisoners, 
irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or 
gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances.15  
 
As a consequence, the UK’s ban fell ‘outside any acceptable margin of 
appreciation’ that might be allowed to a national government in pursuing the 
legitimate aims of ensuring civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law,16 
and it was, therefore, disproportionate and a violation of the Convention. 
It should be noted that, just as the government’s argument failed to offer a 
reason why the prohibition on prisoners (as opposed to offenders) voting was 
necessary in a democratic society, so the Grand Chamber’s opinion offers no 
refutation of that proposition. The majority opinion merely states, correctly, that 
                                                     
14 Hirst, n 3 above, para [71]. 
15 Ibid, para [82]. 
16 Ibid. 
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the ban fails to discriminate among prisoners. The issue at stake, however, is 
whether it is necessary in a democratic society to discriminate between prisoners 
as a group and all other citizens (including convicted offenders who have not been 
imprisoned). Given the insufficiency of the reasons offered by the government, 
the Hirst court simply assumes that this is not necessary without ever addressing 
the question directly.  
Hirst then is an ambiguous judgment. It declares the UK ban to be 
disproportionate without indicating what sort of limitation on voting rights would 
be proportionate. In the subsequent case of Frodl v Austria, the Strasbourg court 
interpreted Hirst’s objection to a ‘blanket’ ban as extending to Austria’s rules 
disenfranchising prisoners convicted of offences of intention and serving more 
than one year. The court concluded that disenfranchisement could only ever be 
exceptional, and, therefore, could only ever be proportionately imposed by a 
judge, on a case-by-case basis, rather than by any legislative rule. Moreover, even 
this would only be possible where there was ‘a link between the offence 
committed and issues relating to elections and democratic institutions’.17  
The reason for this broad interpretation of Hirst derived from a principle 
reiterated by the Frodl court: that ‘prisoners in general continue to enjoy all the 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention save for the 
right to liberty’.18 Any general rule disenfranchising all prisoners or some prisoners 
on grounds of seriousness would necessarily violate that principle in its generality. 
The purpose of Frodl’s narrowly specified criteria was ‘to establish 
disenfranchisement as an exception even in the case of convicted prisoners’, an 
exception that could be accounted for by ‘specific reasoning given in an individual 
decision explaining why in the circumstances of the specific case 
disenfranchisement was necessary’.19  
The Frodl decision, however, implied the need for a very radical reform of the 
UK’s law and made political compromise between Strasbourg and an intransigent 
House of Commons very difficult indeed. As a consequence, in the subsequent 
case of Scoppola v Italy, the Grand Chamber took advantage of Hirst’s ambiguity to 
retreat from the broad interpretation in Frodl.20 It upheld Italian rules that imposed 
a five-year voting ban on prisoners serving more than three years, and a lifetime 
voting ban on prisoners serving more than five years. Again the court did not say 
explicitly that this rule was proportionate. Against the Frodl ruling, the Scoppola 
court pointed out that the Hirst judgment nowhere mentions that judicial 
intervention is essential.21 It ruled that the Italian ban took sufficient account of 
the individual circumstances and gravity of the offence so as to lack the ‘general, 
automatic and indiscriminate character’ of the UK’s ban, and, therefore, fell within 
                                                     
17 Frodl v Austria, 20201/04 (2010), para [34]. 
18 Ibid [25]. 
19 Ibid para [35]. 
20 Scoppola v Italy (No 3) 126/05 (2012). Life prisoners can apply to have the ban revoked on the grounds that 
they have reformed. 
21 Ibid, para [99]. 
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the ‘margin of appreciation’ given to states in judging whether or not a restriction 
on the right is proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.22  
By applying the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Scoppola court avoided 
(or evaded) giving any explicit positive explanation of its own as to why a ban on 
prisoners serving over three years might be necessary and proportionate when the 
UK’s ban could not be. As Judge Bjorgvinsson pointed out in his dissent in 
Scoppola, it is still not clear, therefore, why the Italian rules fall within the margin of 
appreciation if the British rules do not. Without some positive explanation as to 
their proportionality, the Italian legislation may be ‘more lenient’ but it appears to 
be ‘just as blunt as the legislation in the United Kingdom’.23 Moreover, as one 
commentator observed:  
 
there is no principle whatsoever in saying that a law prescribing that no 
prisoner may vote while in prison is arbitrary, while a law prescribing that 
prisoners sentenced to five years or more in prison can be banned from 
voting for life and those sentenced to three years can get a five-year voting 
ban, is not arbitrary. If, in other words, the gravity of the crime, and 
accordingly of the sentence, is sufficient in and of itself to justify a voting 
ban, regardless of the nature of the crime, then why can’t the same reasoning 
be extended to a prison sentence as such, as opposed to say a fine or some 
other form of punishment.24 
 
The position we are left in is one in which the disenfranchisement of prisoners 
serving more than three years will not violate their rights under the ECHR, while 
disenfranchisement of all prisoners will, but without any apparent principle 
underlying these politically significant rulings.25 The unprincipled pragmatism of 
the Scoppola judgment has been widely noted and as widely welcomed for 
providing some basis for a face-saving compromise of the embarrassing political 
stand-off between Westminster and Strasbourg.26  
The Frodl judgment is certainly a more principled interpretation of Hirst. It 
derives a narrow set of exceptional disenfranchisement rules from a general 
                                                     
22 Ibid, [106]-[108]. 
23 See Dissenting Judgement, ibid. 
24 M Milanovic, ‘Prisoner Voting and Strategic Judging’, European Journal of International Law Blog, 22 
May 2012 (available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/prisoner-voting-and-strategic-judging/). 
25 One ‘principle’ that just might reconcile Hirst and Scoppola is found in Judge Caflisch’s Concurring 
Opinion in Hirst. He argues that we should not assume that all prisoners have broken the social contract, 
disenfranchising them will not therefore serve the legitimate aim of inculcating respect for it. If we 
assume that such prisoners are generally serving shorter terms then this might rationalize the Scoppola 
compromise. It should be plain from the preceding argument here, however, that no regime that took 
collective self-government seriously would have the authority to imprison those who had not violated its 
basic rules. I have argued elsewhere that Judge Caflisch’s suggestion would scandalize a political order 
that took self-government seriously, though it has passed almost without comment in our own (see 
Ramsay n 2 above). 
26 See, for example, Milanovic’s concluding remarks in the article cited at n 24 above. 
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principle that prisoners continue to enjoy Convention rights. However, from the 
point of view of democracy as collective self-government, the principled position 
in Frodl is no less subversive than the Scoppola farrago.  
 
 
 
TAKING THE CRACY OUT OF DEMOCRACY 
 
The Frodl judgment argues that prisoners should retain their right to vote because 
it is a fundamental right protected by the ECHR, and the only Convention right 
that is lost by prisoners who are lawfully imprisoned is the ‘right to liberty’. 
Exceptions to this fundamental right should be just that – truly exceptional. This 
sounds very principled and democratic – ensuring universal suffrage in the 
representative political process. But the democratic commitment of this principled 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is as specious as that of the UK government, albeit for a 
different reason: the Strasbourg principle entirely discounts the essential 
connection between the right to liberty that prisoners have lost and collective self-
government.  
The ‘right to liberty’ is the precondition for exercising several of the other 
civil liberties: the right to move, to associate and assemble for example. It is wholly 
artificial to claim that a prisoner enjoys these rights. Moreover, prisoners may 
retain a formal right to free expression, but their actual ability to speak to others is 
hugely circumscribed by their loss of liberty.27 These civil liberties (that are taken 
away from prisoners) are a necessary condition of collective self-government by 
means of representation.28 Without the freedom to innovate, communicate, debate 
and organize around political ideas there is no possibility of the people collectively 
ruling themselves by being the true authors of the laws that they will obey. If the 
executive controls these aspects of a person’s life then, regardless of whether or 
not that person gets to choose between different political products, she is not in 
ultimate control of the terms on which she contributes to their creation or the 
terms on which she participates in political deliberation, and she is not, therefore, 
part of a process of collective self-rule. There is no group of people whose 
liberties are more directly controlled by executive discretion than convicted 
prisoners. 
By overlooking this essential connection between civil liberty and self-
government the European Court of Human Rights, in all three judgments, 
constructs the vote as nothing more than a choice between different political 
                                                     
27 Prisoners’ Article 10 rights are also limited by the needs of prison discipline and order, see R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department ex p Simms and O’Brien [2000] 2 AC 115. See also PSO 4400 which sets out the 
restrictions on prisoners’ access to the media by telephone, and, on prisoners’ rights to correspondence, 
Nilsen v Governor of HMP Full Sutton [2004] EWCA Civ 1540. 
28 There is an overlapping consensus on the essential connections between civil liberty and democratic 
representation (see, for example, R Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989) 170. 
However, as I shall argue, the more minimal the conception of democracy, the narrower the scope of the 
liberties required (see text after n 35 below). 
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products that can be made by any person, including prisoners. But where 
democracy is a regime in which citizens obey laws that they have given to 
themselves, the vote is a decisive moment (literally) in the wider popular 
deliberation as to what the laws ought to be. It is not possible to imagine that the 
political decisions made by representative institutions are in any way the decisions 
of the people unless all citizens are formally equal and formally independent of the 
executive. By virtue of their imprisonment, prisoners are neither of these.  
Prison officials may object to this line of argument. They will justifiably say 
that they encourage political participation by prisoners. Indeed the prison 
governors association and many other organisations involved in the rehabilitation 
of prisoners support the enfranchisement of prisoners, and not without reason. 
They supported the argument, put to the Hirst court by two third party 
interveners, that the rehabilitation of prisoners and their reintegration into normal 
social life is not assisted by disenfranchisement, and would be assisted by re-
enfranchisement.29 Together with the idea that the vote is a universal right, this is 
the most important argument made by those who support reform of the ban. And 
it too exemplifies the thin idea of democracy in which citizens get to vote for 
representatives but they are not taken seriously as the true authors of the laws that 
they are required to obey.  
The reformers’ argument is that prisoners’ rehabilitation will be assisted by 
their inclusion in the electoral process: if the state treats prisoners as citizens by 
allowing them to participate then it is more likely that prisoners will on release take 
their own civic obligations seriously, and vice versa. The problem with the 
argument is that it assumes that because we permit prisoners to vote we therefore 
treat them as citizens of a democracy.30 It assumes that democratic citizenship is a 
matter of being able to choose between different candidates to represent us in the 
legislature. From the standpoint of a regime of collective self-government, we do 
not treat prisoners as citizens merely because we allow them to vote, for we do not 
allow them to deliberate and organize politically in the way that citizens of a 
democracy must be allowed to.  
No doubt many prisoner governors and educators will insist that they would 
encourage prisoners to do more than just vote; they would encourage them to read 
about and discuss the political issues of the day before deciding how they should 
cast their vote. After all, this too is part of taking their civic rights and 
responsibilities seriously. Perhaps prison officials would even extend this 
rehabilitative impulse to allowing imprisoned sympathisers of the British National 
Party or radical Islamism to express their opinions too. Governors and prison 
officers might even forswear taking any account of who holds which opinions in 
their subsequent administration of the prisoners’ lives. But even governors that 
                                                     
29 See Hirst v UK, para [53]. 
30 See for example, V Stern, ‘Prisoners as Citizens: A Comparative View’ (2002) 49 Probation Journal 130, 135; 
D Cheney, ‘Prisoners as Citizens in a Democracy’ (2008) 47(2) Howard Journal 134; S Easton, Prisoners 
Rights: Principles and Practices (Routledge, 2011) 211-39. 
  
Peter Ramsay                                                     Faking Democracy with Prisoners’ Voting Rights  
 
 11
were this liberal about political deliberation would nevertheless be failing to treat 
their prisoners as citizens of a state that takes the aim of collective self-
government seriously.  
Even the most liberal prison governor would not allow voting prisoners to go 
wherever the prisoners wanted to, whenever they wanted to, in order to exchange 
opinions with whomsoever they wanted to, about any subject that they wished to 
discuss, and to associate and assemble with others of their choosing in order to 
organize and promote those opinions. It would be dereliction of a governor’s duty 
if she were to extend these basic liberties to her prisoners as of right. In other 
words, giving prisoners the vote, on the grounds of their citizenship, logically eliminates 
the civil liberties from democratic citizenship. 
It might be true that giving prisoners the vote is in fact an effective means of 
rehabilitating them by encouraging respect for society’s norms. But this would, in 
the same moment, be an admission that those norms do not include the self-
government of the people. If a court or parliament offers prisoners the vote on 
the grounds that they will come to understand their civic responsibilities better, 
any suggestion that those civic responsibilities include a duty to contribute to 
collective self-government would be a false representation, for self-government is 
precisely the capacity that prisoners are unable to exercise by virtue of their formal 
inequality that is brought about by being deprived of civil liberties and being 
rendered formally dependent on the executive. Opponents of the ban are wrong 
to claim that ‘prisoner disenfranchisement is inconsistent with the notion of 
political equality that underlies ideas about the right to vote’.31 On the contrary, 
prisoner disenfranchisement, by ensuring that the political playing field is formally 
equal and free of executive control, is one of the institutional forms of political 
equality.  
Reforming the Representation of the People Act to allow prisoners to vote 
would be a contribution to counterfeiting democracy, extending the outward form 
of democratic government as a cover for the absence of the political substance of 
democracy – the self-government of the people. 
The rehabilitation of offenders is of course an important commitment of a 
truly democratic penal policy because, as we have seen above, much offending 
amounts, among other things, to an implicit repudiation by the offender of the 
possibility of collective self-government. Promoting democratic self-government, 
therefore, requires the penal system to seek to rehabilitate offenders so that they 
too may join the collective process of self-government. In the reformers’ 
argument, however, this relation between democracy and rehabilitation is stood on 
its head. Rather than rehabilitation being understood as a means to the end of 
democratic self-government, the reformers’ present the vote – the democrat’s 
‘right of rights’ – as a means to the end of the rehabilitation of offenders. The 
connection between rehabilitation and democratic self-government is eliminated 
along with the connection between civil liberties and democratic self-rule. 
                                                     
31 H Lardy, ‘Prisoner Disenfranchisement: Constitutional Rights and Wrongs’ (2002) Public Law 524, 545. 
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Both the reformers’ argument that some or all convicted prisoners should 
have the right to vote and the judgments of the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights serve to eliminate the independence of political 
deliberation from executive control as an essential component of democratic 
citizenship. Theirs are arguments that are consistent with the view that democratic 
citizenship is membership in a polity in which people make a choice between 
whatever political options happen to be available, but not with the view that 
democratic citizenship is membership in a polity in which people obey laws they 
have given to themselves. If democratic citizenship is the former, and democracy 
is no more than a process by which one or another section of a political elite gains 
the electorate’s consent to rule, then prisoners can be citizens as much as the next 
person. Indeed, the underlying logic of this argument is that citizens do not need 
any civil liberty beyond the freedom to inspect the legally permissible range of 
political products and to debate their merits sufficiently to allow them to make a 
choice – and this is where the real danger to democracy lies.  
 
 
 
FAKING IT 
 
The transformation of electorates into passive consumers choosing among 
different political products in a narrowly defined and highly manipulated political 
market place is a well-established trend in Western society. The Hirst judgment’s 
assumptions, and the wider argument for prisoners voting rights, are complicit in 
this trend, one that has been described as ‘post-democracy’.32 The connection 
between the post-democratic trend and the rise of neoliberal market imperatives is 
well understood.33 Less well understood is the contribution of human rights to 
post-democracy. 
The term post-democracy may be misleading in some respects, but it is 
apposite in so far as it precisely captures one quality of our political arrangements, 
a quality exemplified by the argument over prisoner enfranchisement. Post-
democratic regimes are not self-consciously anti-democratic. On the contrary, 
their political elites have no alternative to the language of democratic legitimacy. 
They profess great concern for the formalities of democratic politics. This is 
because they are states that persist after an earlier more active political engagement 
on the part of the citizenry has declined, but without the emergence of any 
alternative form of political legitimacy to democracy. Post-democratic regimes are, 
therefore, required to bluff: organizing themselves through elections and parties, 
and making much of participation and democratization, despite the decay of the 
                                                     
32 J Habermas, Guardian 10 November 2011; C Crouch, Post-Democracy (Polity 2004; J Ranciere, Disagreement 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1995). 
33 See Crouch and Ranciere, ibid. The connection between neoliberalism and the kind of punitive excess 
found in the UK government’s assumptions in Hirst has been exhaustively discussed in the literature. 
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substance of democratic politics (that is, of the practice of citizens endeavouring 
to rule themselves).  
Post-democratic regimes are able to pull off this bluff largely because of the 
disappearance of the belief that representative government can be anything more 
than a matter of one or other section of the political elite gaining the votes of 
citizen-consumers in the political market place. Conservatives have long promoted 
this minimalist view of representative government.34 The argument that prisoners 
have a human right to vote indicates the prevalence of this minimalist view among 
liberals and human rights advocates too. Indeed, the rise of human rights talk on 
the political left has been the counterpart of the waning of the social-democratic 
belief in popular sovereignty. We can understand our ‘post-democracy’ as the 
moment in which this minimalist conception of representative democracy has, for 
the present at least, entirely marginalised the connection between political 
representation and the self-government of the people.35  
In the minimalist conception of representative government, the citizen is a 
political consumer. Her civil liberties need to be protected only in so far as it is 
necessary to facilitate a political market place of some sort. Civil liberties are much 
less important in the minimalist conception of democracy than they are to 
democracy as collective self-government. It is perfectly possible to make a choice 
between political alternatives while heavily circumscribing the scope of civil 
liberties. As the political influence of ordinary citizens is reduced to a passive 
choice between narrowly differentiated political brands, it is perhaps no surprise to 
discover the UK government deploying a penal argument for prisoner 
disenfranchisement that implicitly discounts the ultimate political authority of 
citizens. It is more disturbing to find the government’s legal and academic critics 
implicitly discounting the civil liberties that those citizens need if they are 
collectively to be the authors of the law. It is in this fundamental sense that, on all 
sides, the contemporary political order is faking democracy.  
As a practical matter, the enfranchisement of 80,000 or so convicted 
prisoners will make little difference to election results. It is not the practicalities of 
prisoner enfranchisement that are an obstacle to democracy. It is the principle. 
Some compromise of democratic principles in the cause of rehabilitation might be 
less of a problem if we lived in a political culture that was, in general, jealous of its 
civil liberties because it was the political culture of a population energetically 
pursuing self-government. But we are very far from that political culture.36 For 
                                                     
34 See, for example, J Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (George Allen & Unwin, 1943) 269. 
35 The dominant tendency within political theory has always been skeptical about this connection, tending 
to regard so-called ‘direct democracy’ as the condition of achieving popular sovereignty and 
representation as a way of frustrating it. A minority has nevertheless defended representation on these 
grounds. For an account see N Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (University of 
Chicago Press, 2006) 3-8. For contemporary theories of representation as the means to self-government 
see Urbinati, ibid; D Plotke, ‘Representation is Democracy’ (1997) 4(1) Constellations 27; P Ramsay 
‘Democratic Limits to Preventive Criminal Law’ in A Ashworth, L Zedner and P Tomlin (eds), Prevention 
and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
36 For a summary, see KD Ewing, Bonfire of the Liberties (Oxford University Press, 2010) Chs 2-7. 
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anyone who takes the prospect of popular self-government seriously, it is vital not 
to compromise its principles at the present time. 
 The misleading aspect of the term ‘post-democracy’ is that it puts democracy 
in the past, as if we have been there, done that and moved on. But true political 
self-determination was not accomplished in the past, and the potential for political 
freedom remains for human beings to achieve in the future. Of course, to anyone 
who does not take that prospect seriously the principles of self-government will be 
of much less interest. 
Notwithstanding the UK government’s own undemocratic arguments for it, 
the ban on prisoners voting is an institutional form of the democratic principle 
that those who lack civil liberties cannot rule themselves politically. Imprisonment 
is the point at which an offender’s denial of democratic citizenship rights is serious 
enough that it is necessary in a democracy to deprive her of the vote, precisely 
because her denial of citizenship by offending is serious enough to deprive her of 
her liberty. This deprivation of political rights is proportionate because it lasts no 
longer than her imprisonment.37 From the point of view of collective self-
government, disenfranchisement is not an extra punishment in addition to 
imprisonment, but is rather a loss of political rights that is entailed by the 
deprivation of civil liberties.38 Disenfranchisement on this basis does not treat the 
vote as ‘revocable privilege’ to be removed from those who lack ‘moral worth’.39 
The prisoners have themselves repudiated their democratic citizenship rights by 
the implicit denial of citizenship entailed in their offence.40 Nor does the 
suspension of prisoners’ voting rights for the period of their incarceration imply 
that they should be deprived of all rights or endure ‘civic death’. There are very 
good reasons why all kinds of people who lack full citizenship status enjoy many 
rights in a democracy without enjoying the right to vote, and prisoners are no 
exception to this.41  
                                                     
37 This argument rules out US-style felon disenfranchisement after release. 
38 It is only when civil liberty and political freedom are divorced from each other that disenfranchisement 
appears as an extra punishment that is hard to justify on proportionality grounds. See, for example, the 
discussions of disenfranchisement as a retributive response in Bennett, n 8 above, and in Easton, n 30 
above. 
39 Contra S Easton, ‘The Prisoner’s Right to Vote and Civic Responsibility: Reaffirming the Social Contract?’ 
(2009) 56 Probation Journal 226-29.  
40 Of course this is true only in so far as imprisonment is available for a restricted range of offences. In 
practice many people are imprisoned who have not done enough to amount to a renunciation of 
democratic citizenship - for possession offences to take an obvious example. (See Ramsay n 2 and n 35 
above.) Moreover there is some evidence of racial discrimination in sentencing in the UK so that some 
non-white offenders serve time in prison when a white offender would not for an offence of similar 
seriousness. But such offenders should not be in prison at all. Enfranchising them would merely add 
insult to injury and tend to legitimize the far more serious wrongful violation of their civil liberty achieved 
by their imprisonment (contra Cheney, n 30 above).  
41 In a democracy non-citizens (foreigners and children, for example) enjoy the protections of the criminal 
law, rights to legal representation, for example, because they are persons or potential persons and, 
therefore, potential citizens. A democracy would also uphold welfare rights for prisoners and maintain 
the right of all citizens to dispute judicial decisions politically by nominating and voting for prisoners in 
elections. See also Ramsay n 2 above. 
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Complying with the Hirst judgment, on the other hand, will further 
institutionalize the counterfeit conception of democracy in which citizens get to 
vote, but voters are not imagined as self-governing citizens who obey laws that 
they have truly given to themselves. Worse, this counterfeit democracy would be 
institutionalized in the name of democratization, of human rights and of social 
inclusion, with the appearance, at least, of majority support among liberal and left-
leaning penal reformers, experts and academics. It should come as no surprise to 
anybody that our exhausted political class dresses up its elitist arguments in fake 
democratic guise. It is much more problematic when the arguments of the critics, 
the reformers, activists, lawyers and intellectuals also present a fake version of 
democracy. If the critics’ version is left unchallenged, the idea of collective self-
government may be erased from our understanding of what democracy means. 
That would be a severe setback to the interests of all those who currently lack real 
power and authority, imprisoned offenders included. 
